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Simplifying Federal Criminal Laws
ROBERT H. JOOST*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Now that the Reagan Administration and Congress have taken giant steps toward simplifying and rationalizing federal tax laws, they
should return to and complete the task of simplifying and rationalizing federal criminal laws. Simplification and rationalization of
these laws are overdue and important to society.1
Considerable resources have already been invested in criminal law
codification. 2 Twenty years ago, in 1966, Congress created the Na* Judgment Officer, U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission; B.A., 1957,
Yale University; J.D., 1968, Harvard University. The author assisted in developing a
proposal for a revised criminal code for Massachusetts from 1969 to 1971, as Co-Reporter for the Massachusetts Criminal Law Revision Commission. In 1972, Mr. Joost
drafted legislative language for a federal criminal code as Assistant Counsel for the
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Criminal Laws. From 1977
to 1979, the author helped to write a proposed revised basic criminal code for the District of Columbia, as General Counsel of the D.C. Law Revision Commission.
Mr. Joost's analyses and opinions are his own and do not necessarily represent the
views of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the District of Columbia Law Revision Commission, or any other governmental or other organization with
which Mr. Joost has been associated.
Included in this article are citations to the Congressional Index Service [hereinafter
CIS] for easier research assistance to the legislative materials cited.
1.
Whatever view one holds about the penal law, no one will
question its importance in society ....

If penal law is

weak or ineffective, basic human interests are in jeopardy.
If it is harsh or arbitrary in its impact, it works a gross
injustice on those caught within its toils. The law that
carries such responsibilities should surely be as rational
and just as law can be.
Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1952).
2. Resources have been expended on this task from the earliest days of the nation. Agitation for codification was relatively widespread early in the 19th century. In
1820, the Louisiana state legislature passed a statute calling for the preparation of a
comprehensive code of criminal law. The statute provided that "all offenses" in the
new code "should be clearly and explicitly defined, in language generally understood...."

COMPLETE WORKS OF EDMUND LIVINGSTONE ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE

1 (1873). A draft was prepared and submitted by Edward Livingston, but the legislature never enacted it. Sixteen states did enact criminal codes a half-century or so

tional Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws to study the
need for codification and simplification at the federal level. The
Commission, which was set up on a bipartisan basis, spent six years
studying the criminal laws of the federal government, and drafting,
debating, and revising simplified substitutes for them.
President Lyndon B. Johnson, a Democrat, proposed the establishment of this Commission in 1966. He noted that "[a] number of our
criminal laws are obsolete. Many are inconsistent in their efforts to
make the penalty fit the crime. Many - which treat essentially the
same crimes - are scattered in a crazy quilt patchwork through our
criminal code." 3
These observations were echoed by President Richard M. Nixon, a
Republican, when he received the Commission's Final Report in 1971.
President Nixon noted the following:
[For] [o]ver two centuries the Federal criminal law of the United States has
evolved in a manner both sporadic and haphazard ....
[G]aps and loopholes
in the structure of federal law have appeared; worthwhile statutes have
been
4
found on the books side by side with the unusable and the obsolete.

The National Commission5 concluded that both Johnson and
Nixon were right. It recommended to the President and Congress
that Title 18, the criminal law title of the United States Code, be
completely rewritten. The Commission recommended legislative language in its final report to replace all of the substantive-crime sections of Title 18. The Commission's objective, a new Title 18, has not
6
yet been achieved, despite a tremendous amount of effort.
later, on the basis of a code proposal drafted for New York State by David Dudley
Field in 1865. The most successful effort at codification took place almost 100 years
later; in 1962, after years of debate and revision, the American Law Institute published
a "Model Penal Code." The Model Penal Code has been adopted, in whole or significant part, by the legislatures of at least 35 states. This Code is also at the heart of all
the federal proposals discussed in this article.
3. H.R. REP. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1980) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
1396] (message by President Lyndon Johnson, Message of March 9, 1966) [available
CIS, No. H523-42, Criminal Code Revision Act of 1980 (1980)(discussion of H.R. 6915)].
4. S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1981) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 307]
(statement by President Richard Nixon, January 16, 1971) [available CIS, No. S523-1,
Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981 (1982)(discussion of S. 1630)].
5. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT (1971) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. The National Commission is often referred
to as the "Brown Commission" after its Chairman, former California Governor Pat
Brown.
6. Bills based upon the Commission's proposals were introduced in Congress
from 1973 to 1981. Such bills, and their legislative histories, are noted below. All bills
and legislative histories are hereinafter referred to by their numbers, unless otherwise
indicated.
(1) S. 1, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [available CIS, No. S522-1, CriminalJustice Codification, Revision, and Reform Act of 1974 (1975)]; see also Hearingson S. 1 Before the
Subcomm. on Criminal Laws And Procedures, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [available
CIS, No. S521-46, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Part XI (1975); available CIS,
No. S521-19, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws Part X (1975)].
(2) S. 1400, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [available CIS, No. S521-2, Reform of the Fed-
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Now is the time to reassess the National Commission's recommeneral Criminal Laws, Part V (1974)]; see also Hearingson S. 1400 Before the Subcomm.
on CriminalLaws and Procedures,93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [available CIS, No. S52146, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Part XI (1975); available CIS, No. S521-19,
Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Part X (1975)].
(3) S. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [available CIS, No. S522-27, Criminal Justice Reform Act of 1975 (1975)]. Note that S. 1 incorporated the Commission's recomendations and other provisions from the two previous Senate bill Nos. 1 and 1400. See also
Hearings on S. 1 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures,94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1975) [available CIS, No. S521-82, Reform of The Federal Criminal Laws,
Part12 (1975)].
(4) S. 1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [available CIS, No. S523-45, Criminal Code Reform Act of 1977, Part 2 (1977)]. Note that S. 1437 was related to previous Senate bill
Nos. 1 and 1400 of the 93rd Congress. See also Hearings on S. 1437 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [available CIS,
No. S521-57, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Part 13 (1977)]; S. REP. No. 605,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [available CIS, No. S523-46, Criminal Code Reform Act of
1977, Part 2 (1977)]; H.R. Doc. No. 17, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [available CIS, No.
H522-9, Impact of S. 1437 Upon PresentFederal Criminal Laws, Part 1 (1978); available CIS, No. H522-10, Impact of S. 1437 Upon Present and Federal Criminal Laws,
Part2 (1978)]; H.R. Doc. No. 29, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [available CIS, No. H52217, Report of the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice on Recodil cation of FederalCriminal
Law (1978)]. Note that S. 1437 was similar to H.R. 2311 and H.R. 6869, noted below.
(5) H.R. 6869, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See also Hearingson S. 1437 and H.R. 6869
Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice, 95th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (1977-78) [available CIS, No. H521-32, Legislation to Revise and Recodify Federal Criminal Laws, Part
1 (1979); available CIS, No. H521-33, Legislation to Revise and Recodify Federal Criminal Laws, Part2 (1979); available CIS, No. H521-34, Legislation to Revise and Recodify
Federal Criminal Laws, Part3, (1979)]. H.R. 2311 was also discussed during these subcommittee hearings.
(6) H.R. 2311, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). See Hearings on H.R. 6869 Before the Subcomm. on CriminalJustice, 95th Cong., 1st and 2nd Sess. (1977-78) [available CIS, No.
H521-32, Legislation to Revise and Recodify FederalCriminal Laws (1979)].
(7) S. 1722, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [available CIS, No. S 523-1, Criminal Code Reform Act of 1979 (1980)]. S. 1722 was related to S. 1723, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) and
to S. 1437, noted above. See also Appendix Volume to Hearingson S. 1722 and S. 1723,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [available CIS, No. S521-15, Reform of the Federal Criminal
Laws, Part 15 (1980)]; Hearings on S. 1722 and S. 1723 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) [available CIS, No. S521-14, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Part 14 (1980)]. Note that the testimony also
included comments on S. 1 of the 93rd Congress and the 94th Congress, and on S. 1437
of the 95th Congress. See also Chart Showing Disposition of PresentProvisions of Title 18, United States Code, in H.R. 6915 and S. 1722, House of Rep. Comm. on the Judiciary, June 16, 1980 [available CIS, Nos. H522-6 (1980), H522-9 (1980)].
(8) S. 1723, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [available CIS, No. 521-14, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, PartXIV (1980); CIS, No. 521-15, Reform of the Federal Criminal
Laws, PartXV (1980)].
(9) H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [available CIS, No. H523-42, Criminal Code
Revision Act of 1980 (1980)]. See also H.R. REP. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980)
[available CIS, No. H523-42, CriminalCode Revision Act of 1980 (1980)]. H.R. 6915 is
related to H.R. 6233, S. 1722 and S. 1723 of the 95th Congress, and H.R. 13959 and S.
1437 of the 94th Congress, and S. 1 of the 93rd Congress; see also H.R. COMM. PRINT,
96TH CONG., 2D SESS. (1980) [available CIS, No. H522-3, Outline of Provisionsof Title I

dations and the value of codification and simplification of the federal
criminal laws. It is also time to assess why the criminal code bills of
the 1970's failed, and whether a modified criminal-code bill might
pass today.
The failure of Congress to enact a new federal criminal code (from
1972 to 1982) may have resulted, in large part, from the fact that the
code bills included proposals for policy changes that were controversial. Many of these proposals diverted attention from the merits of
codification and simplification. A second reason for the congressional
failure may have been the fact that each code bill was more than five
hundred pages long. It is difficult for two subcommittees, two full
committees, two Houses, and a conference committee to process a bill
that long when a Congress itself exists for only two years.
The enactment of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 19847
may have reduced the problems facing the passage of criminal code
bills in two ways. First, the Comprehensive Act included more than
one hundred pages of material that had previously been included in
the criminal code bills. Such material will not be required in future
criminal code bills which means that future bills will be significantly
shorter than their five hundred page predecessors. The shorter the
bill, the more feasible it will be for Congress to consider it during the
two-year congressional life span. Second, some of the materials
of H.R. 6915 - Criminal Code Revision Act of 1980 (1980)]. See also CIS, No. H521-13,
Revision of the Federal Criminal Code, Part 1 (1982); CIS, No. H521-14, Revision of the
Federal Criminal Code, Part2 (1982); CIS No. H521-15, Revision of the Federal Criminal Code, Part 3 (1982); CIS, No. H521-16, Revision of the Federal Criminal Code, Part
4 (1982); CIS, No. H521-17, Revision of the Federal Criminal Code, Part 5 (1982); CIS
No. H521-18, Revision of the Federal Criminal Code, Part 6 (1982).
(10) S. 1630, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981) [available CIS, No. S523-1, Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981 (1982)]. See also S. REP. No. 307, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [available CIS, No. S523-1, Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981 (1982)]. S. 1630 is related to
the following: S. 1722 and H.R. 6915 of the 96th Congress; S. 1437 of the 95th Congress;
S. 1 of the 94th Congress; and to S. 1 and S. 1400 of the 93rd Congress. See also Hearings on S. 1630 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) [available CIS, No. S521-4, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, PartXVI (1982)].
(11) H.R. 4711, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981).
As noted above, public hearings were held on each of these bills by the appropriate
House and Senate committees. These committees, over the course of approximately 10
years, compiled and published more than 24,000 pages of testimony and exhibits.
There are approximately 12,896 pages in the published Senate hearings and 11,119
pages in the published House hearings.
Note, in particular, that the Senate Judiciary Committee reported a code bill to the
full Senate during every Congress from 1977 until 1981, and the House Judiciary Committee reported such a bill to the full House in 1980. H.R. 9615, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980). In 1978, the full Senate passed such a proposal by a vote of 72 to 15; however,
no code bill was ever acted on by the full House.
7. Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837
(1984) [hereinafter Comprehensive Act].
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passed in the Comprehensive Act were very controversial.8 The inclusion of such controversial subjects in the earlier criminal code bills
may have impeded the timely passage of such bills due to time-consuming debates on divisive policy matters. 9
The obstacles to enactment of a new Title 18 could be further reduced if interested Senators, congressmen, and the Attorney General
of the United States agreed upon the following three points: 1) There
should be a single proposed bill for a new Title 18 which should be
introduced simultaneously in both Houses of Congress; 2) the scope
of the code bill should be limited to Title 18 criminal offenses and felony offenses (now found elsewhere in the United States Code), general rules for applying these offenses, and a minimum number of
conforming amendments; and 3) the principle underlying the code
bill, and the proceedings in Congress, should be to simplify existing
8. The controversial matters include abolition of parole, authorization of preventive detention, and solicitation to commit a violent crime.
9. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [available CIS, No. H523-42, Criminal
Code Revision Act of 1980 (1980)]. It is argued by some that the resolution of such controversial issues by the Comprehensive Act will make enactment of a new code even
more difficult now than it was in the 1970's. This argument is based on the premise
that controversial issues are needed to generate public and congressional support for
any major bill. By enacting controversial materials from the criminal code bills, Congress, according to this argument, made enactment of a code more rather than less difficult. One exponent of this view states that "those members of Congress most likely
to be interested in the subject and, especially the Committee staffers will be reluctant
to retrace the old battles ... if you concede in advance that no controversial substantive issue would be addressed." Letter to Robert Joost from an author who wishes to
remain anonymous (Jan. 2, 1986).
This attitude does not consider the extent of confusion in current federal criminal
law. Although there have recently been declines in the FBI major crime index (as the
percentage of the population under age 30 decreases), the average citizen continues to
regard "crime" as one of his second or third highest public concerns. The average citizen would, in my opinion, regard the passage of a code that reduces this confusion, and
thereby increases the efficiency of law enforcement, as a positive development,
whether or not it includes controversial proposals. As Senator Joseph Biden, the
Chairman-designate of the Senate Judiciary Committee, said in 1981 about the code
bill then being introduced by Senator Strom Thurmond, the then Chairman of that
Committee: "It brings order and reason to a confusing, and in some instances illogical,
mass of criminal laws enacted over the past 200 years. It follows the example of those
States, including Delaware, which have modernized their criminal laws in recent
years." 127 CONG. REC. S9776 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1981), quoted in S. REP. NO. 307,
supra note 4, at 2-3.
It would probably produce delay and might result in defeat for a future code bill if it
included controversial issues such as capital punishment, modification of the exclusionary rule, and habeas corpus reform which were not addressed in the Comprehensive
Act. The major goals of codification (simplification, diminution of confusion, increase
of efficiency) have the greatest chance of accomplishment if they are advanced by
themselves, without any controversial alteration of the substance of present federal
criminal law.

law. If the parties are unable to agree on a particular provision, that
dispute should be resolved by the adoption of language consistent
with the policy set forth in existing statutory law.
Some knowledgeable individuals who have been involved for more
than a decade with proposals for a federal criminal code disagree in
part with the preceding recommendation. Louis B. Schwartz, the former Director of the National Commission on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws, wrote that he considers it desirable to have "a substantial substantive goal beyond simplification."x0 Schwartz commented, "You have to tell people you're going to make beneficial
changes rather than merely beautify.""
Another expert stated that he is opposed to "proceeding from the
dubious calculus that the long range benefits of simplification alone
warrant the enormous costs and risks of a code, even if shorn of any
12
major substantive improvements for law enforcement."
I disagree. I believe that a federal criminal code based on simplification of language and reenactment of existing policy unless changes
are noncontroversial would do much more than merely "beautify"
the federal criminal law. It would be by itself a beneficial change
that would result in major improvements for law enforcement. A
simplified code would, for example, be easier for judges, jurors, and
attorneys to understand and apply. The benefits of such a code, in
terms of efficiency alone, would far exceed any costs it might entail
in terms of "retooling."1 3 Greater ease for judges, jurors, and attorneys means that, with existing resources, the Department of Justice
and the federal courts could do much more than they can today. A
federal criminal code would also be a permanent legacy for the Congress and Administration that enact it and a tribute to the sagacity of
their leaders.14
The resolution of policy differences in accordance with existing law
appears to be a characteristic of the revised criminal codes of the
states. There are at least thirty-five revised state codes - approximately three-quarters of the states have passed them.15 To my
10. Letter from Louis B. Schwartz to Robert Joost (Jan. 23, 1986).
11. Id.
12. Paper transmitted to the author from an expert who wishes to remain anonymous, October 2, 1986. This expert noted "'Current law' is rarely so clear as to defy
dispute, and we could well wind up with a series of hundreds or thousands of compromises reached over many months of negotiation that, in aggregate, represent a significant net loss for law enforcement ......
13. Retooling costs would include retraining for prosecutors, defense attorneys,
and judges and the preparation of new indictment forms and jury instructions.
14. Hammurabi, Justinian, and Napoleon are remembered for the codes of law
promulgated in the course of their administrations.
15. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-1-1 to 13A-14-5 (1982 & Supp. 1986); ALASKA STAT.
§§ 11.16.100 to 11.81.900 (1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-101 to 13-2000 (1978 &
Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-101 to 41-4161 (1978 & Supp. 1984); COLO. REV.
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knowledge, none has ever codified its criminal law and, at the same
time, made controversial changes in criminal justice policy. State
government success with criminal-law simplification and codification
is remarkable in comparison to the federal government's lack of success. Logically, the success rate ought to have been about the same at
federal and state legislative levels because the state legislatures faced
many of the same problems as did Congress (e.g., lengthy text, complicated and essentially dull material, short legislative session). The
states, admittedly, did not have to contend with the difficult issue of
federal jurisdiction or with national security offenses. The absence of
such matters, however, should not account for the greater success
rate at the state level. State government success is more likely to
stem from their apparent decision not to include controversial policy
changes in their criminal code proposals.
There are, of course, some issues which should never be resolved
on the basis of "policy terms consistent with existing law."16 There
are also some subjects as to which there are no existing statutory
laws. In some situations, "existing law" is discernible only if one
compares the number of federal courts of appeal that support position "A" with the number that support position "B." In other situations, "existing law" may mean the position that five United States
STAT. §§ 18-1-101 to 18-18-109 (1978 & Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53a-1 to
53a-261 (West 1972 & Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 101 to 9106 (1974 & Supp.
1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.01 to 893.15 (West 1976 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN.

§§ 16-1-1 to 16-1-14 (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 701-100 to 712-1280 (1976 & Supp. 1984);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1-1-43-2 to 1-1 (Smith-Hurd 1972 & Supp. 1986); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 35-1-1 to 35-50-67 (Burns 1985 & Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 690.1 to 732.6

(West 1977 & Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-101 to 21-46221 (1981 & Supp. 1983);
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 500-010 to 534-060 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1974 & Supp. 1986);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:1 to 14:513 (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, §§ 1
to 1357 (1964 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.01 to 609.89 (West 1967 & Supp.
1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 556.011 to 600.166 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 45-1-102 to 45-10407 (1973); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-101 to 28-1348 (1985); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 625:1 to 651:67 (1974 & Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:1-1 to
2C:98-4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1-1 to 30-28-3 (1984 & Supp.
1986); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 1.00 to 500.10 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1986); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 12.1-01-01 to 12.1-33-04 (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2901.01 to 2967.31 (Anderson 1982 & Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.005 to 167.820 (1971); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 101 to 9183 (Purdon 1983 & Supp. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 22-1-2
to 22-42-13 (1979 & Supp. 1986); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1.04 to 47.09 (Vernon 1974
& Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-1-101 to 76-10-1801 (1978 & Supp. 1986); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-1 to 18.2-510 (1982 & Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 98.04.010 to 94.98.020 (1977 & Supp. 1986); and WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 939.01 to 950.07
(West 1982 & Supp. 1986). See also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 33, §§ 98 to 4628 (1983 & Supp.
1985).
16. See some of the examples in Part III of this article, infra.

Supreme Court Justices took twenty years ago in a 5-4 decision of the
Court. In these circumstances, the Administration and Congress
should determine policy positions on the basis of experience, rationality, cost-benefit analysis, and the purposes of the criminal law, rather
than on the basis of existing law.
Existing law is not helpful in reconciling technical differences (i.e.,
differences in form, language, and style) between different code bills.
Technical differences cannot be reconciled on this basis because all
the code bills, by definition, reject the inconsistent, erratic, and inadequate form, language, and style of existing Title 18 in favor of a
form, language, and style appropriate for a code.
The remainder of this article is divided into three parts. Part II critiques current Title 18 and concludes that simplification and codification are badly needed. Part III offers some suggestions for melding
the substantive and technical differences between the Senate and
House bills into one version that might be enactable by both Houses
of Congress. Part IV contains summary recommendations and
conclusions.
II.

CRITIQUE

A code has been defined as a "complete system of positive law, scientifically arranged .... -17 It implies a "systematic arrangement" of
laws with revisions to "harmonize conflicts, supply omissions, and
generally clarify and make complete the body of laws" involved.i8
Title 18 is-not arranged "scientifically," nor is its arrangement "systematic." Its provisions do not "harmonize conflicts, supply omissions" or "clarify ambiguities"; rather, they do quite the reverse.
Furthermore, Title 18 does not set forth a "complete" statement of
substantive federal criminal law. Many major federal crimes are described in other titles of the United States Code, and many important
principles of substantive federal criminal law are described only in
case decisions of the federal courts.
A code, by virtue of its completeness, organization, and clarity,
makes the law in an area simpler to understand than a compilation
or consolidation of laws. Greater simplicity contributes to greater
public understanding of that law so codified. Title 18, however, does
not simplify federal criminal law, nor does it contribute to public understanding. Although it is called a codified Title, it is not really a
"code." Instead, it is merely a consolidation. If it were a code, offenders, victims, jurors, and witnesses would all benefit.19
17. Wilentz v. Crown Laundry Service, Inc., 116 N.J. E9. 40, 41; 172 A. 331, 332
(1934).
18. Gibson v. State, 214 Ala. 38, 43, 106 So. 231, 235 (1925).
19. "Although no federal effort represents the full answer to this alarming growth
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Although some liberals and conservatives are aware of the benefits
of a code, they have nonetheless failed to support code proposals in
the past because they believed that some of the provisions of the bills
were unacceptable. These critics believed it would be more difficult
to have provisions that were carried over from current law repealed,
since their legitimacy would be enhanced by enactment as part of a
20
code. These concerns could and should be overcome.
A.

Organization

There 'are no federal common-law crimes. Congress, unlike state
legislatures, started with a "clean slate" and created crimes and modified penalties as events and national passions dictated. In 1948, most
of the federal crimes created up to that time were consolidated, without substantial change, into Title 18 of the United States Code. That
Title was called "Crimes and Criminal Procedure." It was organized
alphabetically by chapter, with the exception of chapter 1, which was
designated "General Provisions."
As a consequence of the decision to organize the criminal law alphabetically, unrelated offenses exist side by side in Title 18, while
related offenses are often separated by dozens of chapters. Thus, a
chapter on "Arson" 21 is preceded by a chapter on "Animals, birds,
fish, and plants," 22 and a chapter on "Indians" 23 is squeezed between
a chapter on "Homicide" 24 and a chapter on "Kidnapping." 25 Additionally, the chapter headings are, in some cases, obscure and uninformative. Consider, for example, chapter 33 of Title 18, which is
in crime, new and better federal criminal laws will at least contribute to the solution.
The proposed recodification of federal criminal law is itself a major. contribution to
that solution." Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Part XVI: Hearings on S. 1630
before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11760 (1981)(statement of
William Smith, Att'y. Gen., Justice Dept.) Attorney General Smith testified that a
code "would clarify and rationalize federal criminal law" and "make investigation and
prosecutions more efficient." Id.
20. These concerns could be overcome or, at least, diminished. For example, the
sponsor's opening statement could clearly state that the continuation of a policy,
through its inclusion in the criminal code, would not constitute approval or disapproval
of that policy. An informal agreement could be reached by all the sponsors to oppose
all controversial policy amendments.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 81 (1982).
22. 18 U.S.C. §§ 41-47 (1982).
23. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-65 (1982).
24. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111-17 (1982).
25. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201-02 (1982).

called "Emblems, insignia, and names"26 or chapter 91, which is
27
called "Public lands."
Title 18 was organized on an "odd-numbered" basis because Congress apparently wanted to reserve the even numbers for future
chapters it might enact. By leaving the even numbers blank in 1948,
chapters could be added later that would fit into Title 18 without disrupting its alphabetical order and without requiring renumbering. 28
(On the basis of numbers, there appear to be 119 chapters in "Part I Crimes" of Title 18, but there are really only seventy-two.) Organizing substantive criminal offense chapters on an alphabetical rather
than a type-of-offense basis results in confusion, disadvantages new
prosecutors and defense attorneys, and is nonfunctional. It results in
having too many separate chapters that describe substantive offenses.
Moreover, some of the chapters in the current Title 18 have no apparent purpose at all. For example, chapter 89, which is entitled
"Professions and occupations," 2 9 contains only one provision, section
1821, which deals with, and is entitled "Transportation of
3
dentures." 0
Other chapters in current Title 18 have an apparent purpose; however, this purpose is exactly the same as the apparent purpose of one
or more other chapters. For example, having separate chapters dealing with presidential assassination (chapter 84) and congressional assassination (chapter 18) is redundant. In fact, both of these chapters
are unnecessary. Presidential, congressional, cabinet-member, and
Supreme Court assassinations should all be codified in chapter 51, the
chapter on "Homicide." In addition, the kidnapping aspects of chapters 18 and 84 should be described in chapter 55, which is the chapter
that describes other federal kidnapping and restraint crimes. Similarly, assaults on described officials should be set forth in chapter 7,
which is the chapter on "Assault." All of these units should be made
part of a larger unit that might be entitled "Crimes Against the
Person."
26. All of the sections in chapter 33 deal with the unauthorized use of government
and government-protected "emblems, insignia and names." 18 U.S.C. §§ 700-15 (1982).
27. The sections in the chapter all deal with offenses involving property that constitutes or relates to "public lands." The offenses described in that chapter range from
unauthorized removal to unlawful entry, damage, and destruction. 18 U.S.C. 1851-63
(1982).
28. New chapters have in fact been added to Title 18 since 1948. Each has been
assigned an even number and placed, on the basis of alphabetical considerations,
within the title. A new chapter on Presidential assassinations, added in 1965, was
made chapter 84 and placed between chapter 83, "Postal service" and chapter 85,
"Prison-made goods." Another new chapter, one that is substantively almost identical
to chapter 84, was made chapter 18 because it deals with congressional (rather than
Presidential) assassinations and "C" precedes "P" in the alphabet.
29. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1821 (1982).
30. Id.
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Related offenses are frequently not joined together in the same
chapter in the present Title 18. For instance, crimes that the ordinary person might think of collectively as stealing, are divided into at
least four different chapters: "Embezzlement and theft,"31 "Fraud
'34
and false statements," 32 "Mail fraud," 33 and "Stolen property.
Provisions dealing with related crimes should be joined together.
The foregoing four chapters, for example, should be grouped into one
chapter labeled "Theft and related offenses." This consolidated chapter and related ones might then be joined in a subpart of Title 18, to
be entitled "Offenses involving property."
Current Title 18 presents a different organizational problem at the
individual chapter and section level. There is no organization whatsoever with respect to the placement of sections within a particular
chapter and the placement of subsections within a particular section.
Many of the individual sections are essentially duplications of other
sections in the same chapter and could easily be merged. All of the
sections should be arranged within their respective chapters in some
logical order, such as order of severity.
The offense sections in the present Title 18 appear to have only
one thing in common: each has an opening statement which starts
with the word "Whoever" and ends with a clause that describes the
maximum term of imprisonment and fine that can be imposed on a
person found guilty of the offense. There exist a few subsections
with no titles and no logic behind their presence or absence. In addition, very few paragraphs are indented and many sentences are very
long.
By contrast, the most recently reported Senate and House bill proposals are a model of order and simplicity. The substantive criminal
offenses to be included in Title 18 are divided into nine chapters,
which in turn are subdivided into thirty-eight subchapters. Each offense that is described in each subchapter is organized in accordance
with a descending level of severity of punishment. Most offense sections contain separate subsections dealing with matters like defenses,
grading, and jurisdiction. Many of the subchapters and chapters contain sections which define technical terms and set forth general provisions applicable to more than one offense.
The current Title 18 is like a colony of one-celled organisms. Each
31.
32.
33.
34.

18
18
18
18

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§§
§§
§§
§§

641-65 (1982)
1001-28 (1982).
1341-43 (1982).
2311-19 (1982).

cell, or section, is basically self-sufficient. It sets forth its own stateof-mind requirements, punishment levels, and federal jurisdiction requirements. The code proposals, by contrast, resemble a complex organism which has specialized and interdependent parts. Individual
offense sections are not self-sufficient. The sentencing grade in each
can only be understood by reference to the maximum punishments
prescribed elsewhere in the code; the state of mind and jurisdiction
requirements can only be understood by reference to the chapters on
state of mind and jurisdiction in the general part; and specialized
terms can only be understood by reference to definitions elsewhere
in the code. A code, like a complex biological organism, is more flexible, adaptable, and useful as a result of specialization.
B.

Completeness

Some material is impossible to find in the existing Title 18 simply
because it is not there. Some major federal crimes are described in
other titles of the federal code. For instance, the most seriously punished federal crime, aircraft hijacking resulting in death, is described
in a section in Title 49, the Title on regulation of transportation.3 5
Narcotics offenses are found in sections in Title 21, not in Title 18.36
Espionage offenses involving atomic energy are described in Title 42,
37
and not in Title 18 where other espionage offenses are located. It
may be appropriate to describe certain offenses in the title of the
United States Code that deals with regulation of the subject matter
of that offense (e.g., aviation, narcotics, atomic energy), but the offense, if it is a felony, should be cross-referenced to a section in Title
18.
The descriptions of some crimes are not set forth in any title of the
U.S. Code, but rather in an appendix to one of the titles. The appendix to Title 18, for example, includes such crimes of general concern
as firearms offenses and failing to register for the draft.
Today's Title 18 does not include descriptions or references to all of
the major crimes against the United States, but it does contain descriptions of some crimes that are a bit weird. For example, capturing, killing, stealing, or detaining a carrier pigeon owned by the
United States 38 and writing a check "for a less sum than $1, intended
to circulate as money" 39 are both federal crimes that are described in
35. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1472 (1982). It is considered the most seriously punished federal
crime because it contains a constitutional procedure for the imposition of the death
penalty.

36. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 842(c)(2)(A), 843(c)(1), 844(a), 952(a), 953(a), 955, 959, and
961(2) (1982).

37. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2272, 2077, 2122, 2131, 2138, 2273, and 2276 (1982).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 45 (1982).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 336 (1982).
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Title 18.
C

Readability

Simplification means going beyond codification. Codes may be
written with some sentences that are 200 words or more in length
and with words that average three syllables each. Laws that are
meant to be understood and applied by ordinary people such as jurors, should be easy to understand, which such codes are not.
40
The sections in current Title 18 are not written in "plain English"
and most of them are not easy to understand. Sentences of 200 words
41
or more in length are not uncommon.
A more readable federal criminal law would contribute to a more
efficient criminal justice system because less time would be needed to
make the applicable criminal law understandable to witnesses and jurors. The increase in efficiency might result in more indictments, trials, and dispositions, which might result in greater general
deterrence.
III.

SUGGESTIONS FOR RECONCILING DIFFERENCES

The National Commission, the Senate, and the House of Representatives have each developed language and organization for a new
Title 18. Each has proposed a text that would eliminate the deficien40. The best way to tell whether a writing is in "plain English" may be to apply
the "readability" formula and scale developed by linguist Rudolph Flesch. Under the
Flesch scale, a score of "zero or close to zero" means the material is unreadable or
close to unreadable. A score of "100" or close to 100 means the material is totally or
highly readable. The Internal Revenue Code scored a "-6" on the Flesch scale compared to a "+82" for magazine advertisements. The average insurance policy was a
"+10" and material in the Reader's Digest was a "+65." R. FLESCH, How To WRITE
PLAIN ENGLISH 26 (1981).

41. Consider the following:
If any of the gold or silver coins struck or coined at any of the mints of the
United States shall be debased, or made worse as to the proportion of fine
gold or fine silver therein contained, or shall be of less weight or value than
the same ought to be, pursuant to law, or if any of the scales or weights used
at any of the mints or assay offices of the United States shall be defaced, altered, increased, or diminished through the fault or connivance of any officer
or person employed at the said mints or assay offices, with a fraudulent intent; or if any such officer or person shall embezzle any of the metals at any
time commited to his charge for the purpose of being coined, or any of the
coins struck or coined at the said mint, or any medals, coins, or other moneys
of said mints or assay offices at any time committed to his charge, or of which
he may have assumed the charge, every such officer or person who commits
any of the said offenses shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. 332 (1982).

cies of current Title 18. The Commission's proposals, S. 163042 and
H.R. 6915,43 have much in common.

The three proposals are almost identical on all major points relating to simplification and codification. All three do the following:
1) Separate the elements of federal criminal jurisdiction required for
each offense from the wrongful conduct that makes it an offense;
2) classify the severity of each offense by letter grading; 3) define and
apply to all offenses a limited number of culpable states of mind;
4) consolidate into one basic section, with a few specialized offense
sections, the approximately 116 sections in current Title 18 which
make theft in one or another form a federal crime; 5) consolidate into
a few sections the approximately thirty-eight sections in current Title
18 that deal with arson and property destruction; 6) consolidate into a
few sections the fifty-three or so sections in Title 18 that deal with
counterfeiting, forgery, and related matters; and 7) consolidate into a
few sections the approximately 156 sections in the entire U.S. Code
that make it a crime to make a false statement.
The three proposals also have many differences. Some of the policy and technical differences between the most recent House and
Senate proposals are summarized below. Suggestions are also
presented for reconciling some of those differences. This discussion
may stimulate readers to think of alternative reconciliations and
ways in which other policy and technical differences can be reconciled or neutralized.
A.

Policy Differences
Policy differences between code bills should be resolved, where

feasible, on the basis of policy terms consistent with existing law.44 If

existing law is ambivalent or not acceptable to most interests, a formulation should be devised which reconciles opposing interests in a
way acceptable to each or that postpones the issue for resolution in
42. S. 1630, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1981) [hereinafter S. 1630].

43. H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter H.R. 6915].
44. "I have often proposed - and I continue to do so now - that when a section
of the code is extremely controversial and is unsupported by broad-based interests, the
codifiers ought to return to existing law." H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 3, at 655
(statement of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier). There are difficulties in a "code neutral"
position based on existing laws. As one congressman has remarked:
On some amendments proponents of the bill would argue that it should be
supported because it retains current law. They would state their goal was not
to make changes, but simply to reorganize and put the federal criminal law in
a workable form. On the next amendment, these same proponents would argue that the present law was not satisfactory, and that the proposed amendment would 'modernize' the law and bring it up to date. The bill is a mixture
of a codification of some current law provisions with . . . 'modernization' [of
others].
Id. at 703 (dissenting statement of Rep. Harold L. Volkmer).
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the future.45
Postponement is the best disposition if the issue is highly emotional (e.g., capital punishment) or is one in which a majority exists
to change existing law but is divided as to what change to make. Reconciliation of opposing views is probably not possible in these cases,
and maybe a waste of time to try. The best disposition in these cases
is to include nothing on the subject or to set out present law verbatim
with code-necessitated stylistic changes.
Some examples of policy differences are set forth below. The following also includes suggestions for the possible reconciliation of
these differences.
B.

Criminal Facilitation

The Senate bill provides that "[a] person is criminally liable for an
offense based upon the conduct of another person if he knowingly facilitates the commission of the offense by providing assistance that is
in fact substantial." 46 The House bill rejects this provision on the
ground that it "would have criminalized even the routine provision of
goods or services if the provider knew that the recipient was engaged
in or intended to engage in criminal conduct, even if the provider had
no intent to help such conduct."47
The Senate report quoted the National Commission with approval
on this point: "[t]his section... would provide a legislative solution to
the dilemma faced by a court which has to choose between holding a
facilitator as a full accomplice or absolving him completely of criminal liability."48 The House, by contrast, felt "that the creation of a
general form of such liability could seriously impede the free flow of
commercial goods by forcing merchants to inquire into the intentions
of each purchaser, lest the merchant be accused of being 'willfully
blind' . . . concerning the future criminal use of the goods."4 9 House
45. A code, once enacted, will undoubtedly be amended as frequently as existing
Title 18 has been. Many of the Amendments to the code will change policies in existing law, which means that postponement should not be viewed as defeat when it is

used as a mechanism for reconciliation. It may only be temporary delay. As an illustration, existing law as to two of the examples (G and N) in this Part was changed by

Congress in the six months between the submission of the manuscript to the Pepperdine Law Review and its publication.

46. S. 1630, supra note 37.
47. H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 3, at 670 (separate views of Congressmen John
F. Seiberling, William J. Hughes, and John Conyers).
48. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 4, at 80.
49. H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 3, at 41.

members declared that "such a concept would have been a departure
from traditional principles of accomplice liability which require aiding and abetting with intent to assist the criminal activity, not just
mere knowledge."50

Existing statutory law on this point is vague. It provides that a person commits an offense "as a principal" if he "aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces, or procures its commission."51 However, the law
does not indicate what state of mind is required for criminal liability.
Most federal courts of appeal have approved instructions which state
that the defendant must consciously intend to make the criminal
venture succeed in order to be criminally liable.52 But some other
courts have held that knowingly aiding another to commit a crime is
sufficient for criminal liability.53

The absence of statutory language making facilitation an offense
creates a gap in existing statutory law. The facilitator or supplier is
important to the success of criminal enterprises. The gap means that
he may escape punishment. From a public policy point of view, this
causes the gravest consequences to espionage and organized-crime offenses. If knowing facilitation was a crime in all circumstances, persons who routinely provide goods and services to the public might be
vulnerable to criminal investigation whenever one of their "suspicious" customers commits a crime. If the gap were filled only in the
gravest of circumstances, however, honest suppliers would be unlikely to be burdened and public safety would be enhanced. The Senate and the House position on criminal facilitation could be
reconciled by the following: (1) Establishing the offense of facilitation
as a national security or racketeering offense; and (2) incorporating
specific national security and racketeering offenses into the section.
C. CriminalLiability of Each Co-Conspiratorfor Each Offense
Committed by any Member of the Conspiracy
The Senate bill includes the Pinkerton54 rule, which provides that
a member of a conspiracy is criminally liable for each offense committed by any other member of the conspiracy in furtherance of the
conspiracy. 55 The House bill rejects the Pinkerton rule and instead
50. Id. at 670.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1982).
52. United States v. Tijerina, 446 F.2d 675, 677-78 n.1 (10th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Kelton, 446 F.2d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1971).
53. United States v. Greer, 467 F.2d 1064, 1069 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.

929 (1973); United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 986 (1971).
54. The rule is named after the decision in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.
640 (1946).
55. S. 1630, supra note 37, § 401(c). The subsection provides that a person is criminally liable for an offense based upon the conduct of another person if (1) he and the
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follows the position of the Model Penal Code. 56 Pinkerton is existing
law, but it is not existing statutory law. Therefore, it is arguable that
the recommended rule for reconciling differences should not apply.
Rather, this question should be decided on the merits.
The Senate report acknowledges that the Pinkerton rule has been
criticized by "those who believe that criminal liability should not attach where the facts would not support conviction on traditional
aider and abettor grounds." 57 Nevertheless, it recommends continuation of the rule by statute on the ground that persons who set in motion a chain of criminal events should be accountable for foreseeable
related offenses committed by co-conspirators. Abrogation of the
Pinkerton rule would, according to the Senate report, seriously harm
law enforcement.5 8
In support of its decision not to include the rule, the House report
quotes the following from a 1953 commentary on a provision of the
Model Penal Code:
The reason for [not including Pinkerton liability] is that there appears to be
no other or no better way to confine within reasonable limits the scope of liability to which conspiracy may theoretically give rise. In People v. Luciano,
277 N.Y. 348, 14 N.E. 2d 433 (1938), for example, Luciano and others were convicted of sixty-two counts of compulsory prostitution, each count involving a
specific instance of placing a girl in a house of prostitution, receiving money
for so doing or receiving money from the earnings of a prostitute .... The
liability was properly imposed with respect to these defendants who directed
other person engaged in the offense of criminal conspiracy, (2) the other person engaged in the conduct in furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) the conduct was authorized by the agreement forming the conspiracy or was reasonably foreseeable that it
would be performed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id.
56. H.R. 6915, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1102(a) (1980). This House bill states in relevant part:
Except as otherwise provided by law, if 2 or more persons, with intent that a
crime (other than an attempt) be committed, knowingly agree to engage in
the conduct that is required for the crime so intended, and any one of those
persons so agreeing intentionally engages in any conduct in furtherance of
the intended crime, each such person commits an offense one class next below
the most serious crime so intended.
Id. (emphasis added). See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1980).
57. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 4, at 81-82.
58.
The Committee's research indicates that more than one hundred cases involving the Pinkerton principle of liability have been decided by the federal courts
of appeal in the last five years. Given the fact that approximately eighty percent of federal convictions occur as a result of guilty pleas as to which no appellate review would occcur, this figure may be translated into an estimate
that Pinkerton currently account for around one hundred convictions per year
.... [Ilt
is clear that elimination of the well established Pinkerton doctrine
would have a substantial adverse impact on law enforcement.
S. REP. No. 307, supra note 4, at 82.

and controlled the combination; they commanded, encouraged and aided the
commission of numberless specific crimes. But would so extensive a liability
be just for each of the prostitutes or runners involved in the plan? ....
A
court would, and should hold that they are all parties to a single, large, conspiracy; this is itself, and ought to be, a crime. But it is one crime ....
Law
would lose all sense of proportion if in virtue of that one crime, each were
59
held accountable for thousands of offenses that he did not influence at all.

A reasonable compromise between the House and Senate positions
would be to codify the rule but limit it. The logic of the Pinkerton
rule, and the practical needs of law enforcement, would best be
served if the rule was codified to include supervisors or managing directors of criminal conspiracies, but not to include support staff. A
person would be criminally liable for an offense based on the conduct
of another person if he has significant responsibility or authority for
all or part of the subject matter of the conspiracy, or has, by virtue of
position or influence, the power to prevent the conduct from
occurring.
D.

Unauthorized Use of a FederalMotor Vehicle

The House bill contains a section that makes it an offense to knowingly take, operate, or exercise control over an automobile, aircraft,
motorcycle, motorboat or other motor-propelled vehicle without the
owner's consent, if that vehicle is owned by the federal government
or if the offense occurs in an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction
(e.g., high seas). 60 The Senate bill contains no such provision. The
House report admits that this section "is new to Federal law."61
Under normal application of the "existing law" principle of reconciliation, the section would be left out of a code. Excluding this section, however, might be a mistake. Joyriding in federal-governmentowned trucks and jeeps should be penalized. The offense should not
be left to the discretion of state and local prosecutors who have no
particular interest in federal problems. Federal prosecutors should
have this section so they will have an alternative to prosecuting for
theft if the vehicle taken is returned. An effort should be made to
secure a consensus in favor of including this provision in a new code.
E.

PossessingBurglar's Tools

The Senate bill makes it a federal offense if a person "possesses an
object that is designed for, or commonly used for, the facilitation of a
forcible entry" with intent to use that object to commit burglary,
criminal entry, or criminal trespass. 62 The House bill does not in59. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.04 comment at 21 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953), quoted in
H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 3, at 39.
60. H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 2539.
61. H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 3, at 326.
62. S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1715.
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clude an equivalent section.
The Senate report admits that "[t]here is no existing Federal provision prohibiting the possession of 'burglar's tools.' "63 The Senate report also indicates that forty-three of the states have statutes that
make it a crime to possess "burglar's tools."
The House position, excluding offenses of this type, should be
adopted. The House position represents existing law, and there is
not, as with joyriding in a federal motor vehicle, a strong federal interest in changing that law.
F

Negligent Homicide

The Senate bill establishes an offense called "negligent homicide."
It is made a federal crime for a person to engage in "conduct by
which he negligently causes the death of another person."64 The
House bill has no equivalent provision.
Section 1112 of current Title 18 makes it an offense to kill a human
being "in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce
6
death." 5
The Senate position should be adopted because its provision carries
forward the essence of the existing-law language which is quoted in
the preceding paragraph. The jurisdictional reach of the Senate provision should, however, be reduced to approximate the jurisdictional
reach of existing section 1112. Section 1112 makes "negligent" homicide a crime if it is committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The Senate bill makes it a
crime if it is committed, inter alia, against "an inspector who performs inspections .

.

. carried out to satisfy requirements under the

Atomic Energy Act of 1954," if it is committed "by transmitting a
dangerous weapon through the United States mail," or if it is committed "on a railroad vehicle operating in interstate or foreign commerce

66
"....

63. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 4, at 666.
64. S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1603.
65. 18 U.S.C. § 1112 (1982).
66. S. 1630, supra note 37, §§ 1601(e)(2)(C)(ii), 1601(e)(3), and 1601(e)(5). These
jurisdictional bases are among those included in the negligent homicide section of the
Senate bill by virtue of a cross-reference in section 1603(c). Section 1601(e)(1) is the
only jurisdictional base provision that should be cross-referenced into section 1603 if
existing law is to be the basis for reconciliation. It would make for a much more understandable code if the language of section 1601(e)(1) were printed, as part of section
1603, rather than cross-referenced.

G.

Unlawful Sexual Contact

The Senate bill makes a "touching of the sexual or other intimate
parts of a person to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person" 67 an offense if it is done under circumstances that would constitute rape or sexual abuse of a minor or a ward if the touching
involved intercourse. 68 The House bill includes no equivalent provision. The Congress adopted the Senate position in 1986 as part of the
"Sexual Abuse Act of 1986."69 It should therefore be adopted in a future code bill.
H.

Aircraft Hijacking

Aircraft hijacking, under the name "aircraft piracy," is already a
severely punished federal crime. 70 While the Senate bill makes aircraft hijacking a Title 18 federal crime, 71 the House bill does not. Instead, the offense is set forth in Title 49 rather than in Title 18. The
House bill does not propose to repeal this section.
Since the House bill does not repeal 49 U.S.C. section 1472, there is
no substantive policy difference between the two Code bills. The
Senate position should, as a technical matter, be adopted for the code.
The offense of aircraft hijacking, which is a Class B felony (twenty
years imprisonment), is serious enough to deserve to be included in
the criminal rather than the transportation code of the United States.
I. Failing to Keep a Government Record
The Senate bill makes it a crime for a person who is responsible
for keeping records for an organization or agency to fail, with intent
to defraud, to maintain a record required as a result or condition of a
federal grant, contract, loan, or other form of federal assistance. 72
The House bill contains no such provision.
The Senate Report admits that "[t]his offense has no counterpart
in present federal law." 73 The bills should be reconciled on this point
by adhering to existing law and adopting the House position.
J.

False Swearing
The Senate bill provides for an offense termed false swearing. 74

67. The term "sexual contact" is so defined in section 1646(a)(2) of S. 1630. The
Senate bill section under discussion makes it an offense to engage in "sexual contact"

under certain circumstances.
68. S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1645.
69. Public Law 99-646, § 87(b).
70. S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1631.

71.
72.
73.
74.

49 U.S.C. § 1472 (App. 1982).
S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1345.
S. REP. No. 307, supra note 4, at 418.
S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1342.
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False swearing is a lesser-included offense to perjury. It is graded
lower than perjury (Class A misdemeanor v. Class D felony), but the
requirements are basically the same. There is, however, one important exception: any false statement under oath in an official proceeding can be prosecuted as false swearing, but only false statements
that are "material" can be prosecuted as perjury. The House bill
does not provide for an offense of false swearing, although it does
provide for an offense called "making a false statement."7 5
A provision of existing law makes it a crime for any person in a
matter within federal government jurisdiction to make "any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations." 76 Pursuant to
this position, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that a false statement need not be material in order to
be criminal.7 7 If a false statement not under oath could be prosecuted pursuant to this provision of existing law, regardless of its materiality, then the proposed false swearing section is encompassed by
the substance of existing law. Although this conclusion is not valid
in all cases because other federal courts of appeal disagree with the
Second Circuit on this point,78 the penalty for violating the provision
in existing law (five years imprisonment) is 500% higher than the
proposed penalty for violating the false swearing section in the proposed Senate bill.
The Senate proposal was recommended on practical grounds by the
National Commission.79 A senior counsel to the Commission noted
the following:
[P]rosecutions for perjury have been dismissed, perhaps needlessly, because of
holdings that the defendant, though he may have lied deliberately under oath,
did not, under the circumstances of the case, lie as to material matter. Such
difficult cases have led to proposals such as that of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, to eliminate materiality altogether
from the definition of perjury.8 0
75. H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 1742.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1982).
77. United States v. Silver, 235 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 880
(1956); United States v. Marchisio, 344 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1965).
78. Gonzales v. United States, 286 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
878 (1961); United States v. Larocca, 245 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1957); Freidus v. United
States, 223 F.2d 598 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
79. FINAL REPORT, supra note 5, § 1252(1). The inclusion of a false swearing section without any requirement of materiality as to the statement was also recommended by the Model Penal Code. MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.2 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
80. Working Papers, National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Law, at
661-62 (1970).

Under all the circumstances, it is recommended that the two proposals be reconciled by adopting the Senate position. There is no existing statutory law on this point, but logic favors the Senate position.
K

Impairment of Military Service Obligation

The House bill contains a section entitled "Wartime impairment of
military service obligations."81 It provides, inter alia, that a person
commits a Class D felony if he "knowingly" impairs the recruitment,
conscription, or induction of any person in the armed forces of the
United States during a time of war or national emergency.
The Senate bill contains an equivalent section8 2 entitled "Obstructing Military Recruitment or Induction."8 3 This section provides
that the conduct proscribed must be performed "with intent to hinder, interfere with, or obstruct the recruitment, conscription, or in8
duction of a person into the armed forces of the United States." 4
Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier, who was a member of the
National Commission, declared that the state of mind requirement in
the House bill "is a departure from current federal law which requires a specific intent to interfere with, hinder or obstruct the recruitment, conscription or induction of persons into the military."85
A new code bill should adopt the Senate provision and require
proof of intent because one of the sections in existing law which gave
rise to this section makes the proscribed conduct a crime only if it is
86

committed "willfully."

L.

"Enmons"

"Enmons" refers to the holding of the United States Supreme
Court in the case of United States v. Enmons.8 7 In that case, the
Court held, by a 5 to 4 vote, that violence or the threat of violence in
the context of a labor dispute does not violate federal extortion law
because the conduct in such context was not committed
"wrongfully."
The House bill upholds the Enmons rule immunizing activity related to a labor dispute from prosecution for extortion by including
the word "wrongfully" in its definition of the offense of extortion.8 8
81. H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 1316.
82. Unlike the House section, the Senate section does not apply in time of national
defense emergency. It is only operational "in time of war."
83. S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1115.
84. S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1115(a).
85. H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 3, at 654 (statement by Rep. Robert W.
Kastenmeier).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 2388(a) (1982).
87. 410 U.S. 396 (1973).
88. See H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 2522(a) ("Whoever knowingly threatens or
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One of the committee members stated the rationale for preserving
the rule in the following words:
A legislative overruling of Enmons would involve federal law enforcement officials in any labor dispute in which property damage occurred during picketing intended to induce an employer's
agreement, as long as the employer was
89
engaged in interstate commerce.

The report that accompanies Senate code bill S. 1630 states that the
Senate Committee reached the same conclusion as the House Committee and decided to preserve the Enmons doctrine:
The Committee has concluded that for the purposes of this bill the Enmons
decision should not be modified. On the other hand, the Committee believes
that the thrust of an extortion statute should be to punish violent extortionate
means to obtain the property of another regardless of the legality of the ends
sought and has carried forward current law to that effect in situations not involving a labor dispute. 9 0

The extortion provisions of S. 1630, however, do not support the
language of this report. The magic word, "wrongfully," is not used in
the definition of the offense, and there is nothing in the provision itself to suggest that labor-dispute-related violence is exempt from
prosecution under this section.
An earlier Senate code bill, S. 1722, did contain language that
would clearly have preserved the Enmons ruling while placing some
91
limitations on it:
(b) BAR TO PROSECUTION. It is a bar to prosecution under this section
that the offense occurred in connection with a labor dispute as defined in 29
U.S.C. 152(9) to achieve legitimate collective bargaining objectives, unless
there is clear proof that the conduct which constitutes the threat or placing in
fear required under subsection (a)(1) consists of a felony and the conduct was
engaged in for the purpose of causing death or severe bodily injury in order to
achieve such objectives and [a top Justice Department official certifies that
such elements are present, that a federal prosecution should be commenced,
and that the applicable State is 'unable or unwilling' to prosecute for such
conduct].

It would be a misuse of the phrase "existing law" to call a doctrine
that is set forth in a 5 to 4 decision of the United States Supreme
Court "existing law" and to preserve it when it is highly controversial. It is, after all, the constitutional function of Congress to make
the laws. The phrase "existing law" has no meaning in terms of separation of powers if the phrase includes existing case law. On this
places another in fear that [any person will be injured or kidnapped or any property
will be damaged] and thereby wrongfully obtains property of another . . . commits
) (emphasis
..... added).
89. H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 3, at 649 (statement of Rep. Don Edwards).
90. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 4, at 677.
91. S. 1722 § 1722(b).

question, Congress itself must face the question of whether or not to
exempt violent activities connected with a labor dispute from the
reach of the federal criminal law of extortion.
It is the author's personal view that the S. 1722 "bar to prosecution" represents the best possible resolution of this issue. The bar to
prosecution prevents state criminal jurisdiction from being further
eroded in the labor management relations field while it maintains,
via the certification procedure, a federal presence that could be called
upon in the extreme case.
M.

Logan Act

The Logan Act 9 2 is one of the oldest federal criminal statutes and
the most moribund. Although it was enacted in 1799, it has never
formed the basis of a prosecution. The Act makes it a crime for a
United States citizen, acting without authority, to commence or carry
out any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government
or personnel thereof "with intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign government or any officer or agents thereof, in
relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States."
Although the constitutionality of the Act has been drawn into question, 93 the issue has never been decided because the statute has never
been used.
The Senate bill repeals the Logan Act and replaces it with an
9
equivalent offense entitled "Interfering with Foreign Relations." 4
The new section requires a showing of actual interference with the
foreign relations of the United States and makes the offense applicable to any person who owes allegiance to the United States rather
than only to American citizens. The House bill reenacts the Logan
95
Act.
Both decisions were criticized. Congressman John Conyers, Jr., a
House Judiciary Committee member, characterized the Logan Act as
"legislation at its worst." 9 6 A spokesman for Senate conservatives
listed the proposed repeal of the Logan Act as point number twenty
five in his memorandum urging opposition to the Senate code bill. 9 7
Application of the "existing law" rule would lead to retention of
the Logan Act in a new code, despite the fact that the Logan Act has
never formed the basis for a prosecution in almost 200 years and may,
in fact, be unconstitutional. Using the "existing law" rule to reach
92. 18 U.S.C. § 953 (1982).
93.
94.
95.
96.

Waldron v. British Petroleum Co., 231 F. Supp. 72, 89 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1207.
H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 415.
H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 3, at 689.

97. Hammond, Memorandum (August 10, 1981)(unpublished material).
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such a result would be foolish. It makes more sense to follow the
Senate proposal and retain the Logan Act in spirit while changing its
words to make sure that they are constitutional.
N. Spousal Immunity for Rape
At common law, in a limitation long embodied in federal statutory
law, a person could not be found guilty of raping his own spouse. 98
This limitation was not carried forward in either the Senate or the
House 99 code bill.
Curiously, neither the Senate Committee report nor the House
Committee report gives any reasons for this change from existing
law. The change was supported by womens' rights groups, and it is
opposed by some conservatives.
The Congress, in 1986, changed federal statutory law and eliminated the limitation, as part of the Sexual Abuse Act of 1986.100
Spousal immunity as to rape is no longer federal law.
Since the position taken on this issue by both the House and Senate code bills is now existing law, it should be adopted in a future
code bill.
0.

Obstructing a Government Function by Fraud

Existing law makes it a felony offense to conspire to obstruct a
government function by defrauding the United States. 101 The provision does not require that the objective of the conspiracy be a substantive offense so long as the actor conspires "to defraud the United
States, or any agency thereof, in any manner or for any purpose." 0 2
The section has been construed very broadly, as the following quotations from United States Supreme Court opinions indicate:
[I]t is not essential that such a conspiracy [to defraud the United States Government] shall contemplate a financial loss or that one shall result. The statute is broad enough in its terms to include any conspiracy for the purpose of
impairing, obstructing, or defeating the lawful function of any department of
103
Government.
To conspire to defraud the United States means primarily to cheat the
United States Government out of property or money, but it also means to interfere with or obstruct one of its lawful governmental functions by deceit,
98. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, 154-56 (1969); but cf. United States v. Lone Bear,
579 F.2d 522, 525 (9th Cir. 1978).
99. See S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1641; see also H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 2331.
100. Public Law 99-646, § 87(b).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982)(the maximum term of imprisonment is five years).
102. Id.
103. Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479 (1910).

craft, or trickery, or at [the very] least by means that are dishonest.

10 4

The Senate bill makes it a felony offense to intentionally obstruct
or impair a government function "by defrauding the government
through misrepresentation, chicanery, trickery, deceit, craft, overreaching, or other dishonest means."105 This section does not make it
a prerequisite to conviction that the actor was engaged in a conspiracy with the objective of committing such an offense.
The House bill contains a section which is entitled "Conspiracy to
fraudulently obstruct a Government function."1 06 This provision is
closer to existing law than the Senate provision because it makes
proof of a conspiracy a prerequisite to conviction.1 07 Moreover, it
does not add words from court decisions (e.g., chicanery, trickery, deceit, craft, overreaching) to the language of the proposed statute, as
does the Senate version. The House bill, however, defines the term
"fraud" in its general definitions section. 108 This definition makes
the application of this statute far narrower than existing law given
the propensity of the federal courts to define the term fraud very
broadly.
The House conspiracy section is closer to existing law than the
Senate offense section. Therefore, it should be adopted in future
code legislation, provided the legislation does not define statutorily
the term "fraud."
P.

Federal Criminal Jurisdiction

The House and Senate bills are not very far apart on the issue of
federal criminal jurisdiction. Both devoted liberals and dedicated
conservatives, however, are nervous about the scope of federal jurisdiction under the code bills. Both fear that the code would move the
United States along the road toward a centralized criminal justice
system and a national police force.
A liberal congressman argued that "affect on interstate commerce"
and "use of the mails" should never be the basis for federal investigation and prosecution unless that affect or use played "a substantial
104. Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188 (1924).
105. S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1301 (the offense is classified as a Class D felony
which means the maximum term of imprisonment is six years).
106. H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 1705 (the offense is classified as a Class D felony
which means that the maximum term of imprisonment is 40 months).
107. The House code bill also contains two specific offense sections which do not
require proof of a conspiracy in order to establish criminal liability. The offenses,
which are termed "Obstructing a Government

Inspection By Fraud" (H.R. 6915,

§ 1703) and "Obtaining a Government authorization by fraud" (H.R. 6915, § 1704), are
much narrower in scope than the proposed section in the Senate bill which also obviates the need to prove a conspiracy. Nevertheless, they do represent an expansion of
existing law.
108. H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 101(16).
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role in the offense." 109 The National Association of Attorneys General, a group that could be described as conservative, declared that "a
purely incidental use of, or effect on, interstate commerce is an inappropriate basis for federal action."1 1 0 The group urged Congress to
"reconsider the necessity of each extension of federal jurisdiction
which has been added over the last 200 years.""'l
The safeguard against unwarranted extension of federal criminal
jurisdiction proposed in both code bills112 is a provision authorizing
the U.S. Attorney General to issue guidelines for the exercise of federal jurisdiction. These guidelines would provide for declination of
federal jurisdiction unless a "substantial federal interest" would be
served by having a federal prosecution.
The current Chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice,
Congressman John Conyers dismissed the idea of guidelines as a
safeguard:
The problem with this approval is that by giving the Attorney General authority to determine, in administrative guidelines, what constitutes a substantial federal interest, Congress gives away its authority and responsibilty to
write the laws. Further, by making the requirement of a substantial federal
interest jurisdictional, the determination of substantiality is for the court to
make in individual cases. A determination made in administrative guidelines
would be effectively unreviewable by the court and beyond attack by a de'1 1 3
fendant who questions the Attorney General's definition of "substantial.

Existing statutory law alone is not an adequate useful guide
through the federal jurisdictional thicket because there are a number
of existing Title 18 sections which have a very broad jurisdictional
reach.114 Unless there are reductions of some of them, codification
may extend their influence automatically. By consolidating a large
number of statutes and making the jurisdictional bases for each one
of the jurisdictional bases for the consolidated section, the impact of
existing laws like the Hobbs Act will be increased.
109. Id.
110. H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 3, at 692 (statement of the National Association
of Attorneys General).
111. Id. at 693.
112. S. 1630, supra note 37, § 205(c); H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 115(b).
113. Id.
114. The Hobbs Act, for example, penalizes a person who acts in the following
manner:
In any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement
of any article or commodity in commerce, by... extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or
property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this
section.
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982).

The members of the House and Senate must deal with the jurisdiction-expanding phenomenon of codification, or they will find that
they have in fact expanded federal jurisdiction without intending to
do so. 115 The best way to avoid such expansion may be to cut back or
modify the extremely broad bases of jurisdiction such as "affects interstate commerce" or "use of the mails." It is arguable that, as a
general rule, the federal government should not have jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute unless the alleged criminal activity "has a
direct effect on interstate commerce," affects a purely federal interest, or involves an "opponent" such as organized crime which may
have greater resources than the law enforcement agencies of some
states.
IV.

TECHNICAL DIFFERENCES

The differences of form, language, and style between the House
and Senate code bills cannot be resolved on the basis of existing law
since both bills substitute an entirely new technical framework for
existing federal statutory criminal law.116 The usual reconciliation
practice is probably inappropriate. This practice calls for each House
of Congress to "recede" to approximately the same number of points

in the bill passed by the other House. The usual practice would not
reflect the fact that the form, language, and style of a code are very
important to understanding, applying, and enforcing it. Trading
technicals on a number-of-points basis might produce a lack of stylistic consistency,
readability
problems,
and mistaken court
constructions.
A dispassionate study of the House and Senate code bills indicates

that each has form, language, and style that appear to an outsider to
be superior to equivalent points in the other bill. It further appears
115. See generally Quigley, The Federal Criminal Code Revision Plan, 47 GEO.
A contrary view is expressed in Pauley, An Analysis of
Some Aspects of Jurisdiction Under S. 1437, The Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 47
GEO. WASH. L. REV. (1979). Pauley contends that no action is necessary to limit jurisWASH. L. REV. 459 (1979).

diction under a code because the primary mechanism by which Congress historically
has limited federal law enforcement and federal prosecution, limitation of appropriations, is unaffected by codification.
116.
The bill makes . . . myriad changes in form and terminology. This in itself
would not trouble us if all the changes had been adequately discussed and the
consequences fully understood. Many of these changes are essentially the
work of Subcommittee staff. On several occasions it became apparent that the
Chairman and the other members of the Subcommittee were not fully aware
of some of the implications of these changes, and in some cases the staff did
not understand them either. We have the uncomfortable feeling that this bill
is loaded with 'sleepers' on every page, and that future prosecutors, defendants, courts, and Congresses will be uncovering them for decades to come.
H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 3, at 669 (separate views of Congressmen Seiberling,
Hughes, and Conyers).
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that there are additional form, language, and style points which, if inserted in a new code bill, would make it technically superior to both
bills.
Lists that were prepared by the author in 1980, when House and
Senate passage of a code bill appeared imminent, indicated to the author that the House bill was better than the Senate bill in 101 specific
technical points. In addition, there was indication that the Senate bill
was better than the House bill in fifty-seven specific technical points.
Also, the Senate's points tended to be applicable on a greater number
of occasions than the House's.
This observation that neither House had a monopoly on technical
superiority can be illustrated by a number of examples taken from
both bills:
The House bill does not include a section setting forth the "general
purposes" of a criminal code, whereas the Senate bill does. 1 7 The
House position is better because it is impossible to set forth the general purposes of a criminal code without resorting to some words and
phrases that are ambiguous. Ambiguity invites judicial construction,
and judicial construction of ambiguous terms can result in decisions
that were never intended by the members who voted for that
language.
The House bill does not suggest that only men will be criminal perpetrators and offenders, whereas the Senate bill does. The Senate
bill uses "he," "him," and "his" exclusively, and then relies on an obscure paragraph to declare that "[a] term... that signifies the masculine gender includes and applies to the feminine gender and the
neuter gender.... ." The House position, which involves heavy use of
sex-neutral terms like "person," "actor," and "defendant," is better
because it doesn't have to be explained."18
The Senate bill gives each subsection in new Title 18 a title,
whereas the House bill does not. These subsection titles attempt to
indicate accurately the subject matter covered by each subsection.
The Senate position is better because it leads to better organization of
the section and makes it easier to understand each subsection." 9
In addition, the Senate bill sets forth a table of contents for the entire new Title 18. Since the official text should be designed to inform
117. S. 1630, supra note 37, § 101.
118. Id. § 112(e)(3).
119. This stylistic device has been adopted by Congress in many of the new Title 18
sections enacted as part of the Comprehensive Act, and in the sections enacted by the
Sexual Abuse Act of 1986.

citizens of what may be the most important title of the United States
code, the Senate position is better.
Following, in more abbreviated language, are a number of style
points that are taken from both the House and Senate bills which are
recommended for use in a future code bill. They have in common the
fact that they make provisions of the code somewhat easier to understand and apply.
Stylistic points seldom receive much attention from political leaders, but the real-world success of the effort to simplify federal criminal laws will depend heavily on the stylistic skill with which the final
product is presented. The success of a code will, after all, depend
heavily on the ability of ordinary people like jurors to understand
and apply the law efficiently and effectively.
The following form, language, and style points from the House bill
are recommended:
1. To achieve greater clarity, use the House bill's "action and consequence" formulation instead of the Senate bill's "parenthetical action" formulation. Thus, for the offense of arson, use the term "a
person knowingly starts a fire or sets off an explosion and thereby
causes damage,"120 instead of "if, by fire or explosion, [a person] damages a public facility; or damages substantially a building or a public
structure."121 Or, for the offense of aggravated battery, state "uses
physical force and thereby ... causes serious bodily injury,"'122 rather
23
than "if, by physical force, he causes serious bodily injury."

2. Use the House bill's phrase "an individual who is found guilty,"
rather than the more telegraphic and colloquial Senate bill phrase
"an individual found guilty."
3. Adopt the House bill's phrase "State crime punishable by more
than one year's imprisonment," rather than the Senate bill's phrase
"State or local felony." This is better because many jurors and others
do not know that a felony normally means a crime punishable by
more than one year's imprisonment. In addition, several modern
state criminal codes do not use the term "felony."
4. Make "Indian country jurisdiction" a separate base for federal
criminal jurisdiction, as in the House bill,124 rather than including it
as one of several separate bases for federal criminal jurisdiction
5
under the "Special Territorial Jurisdiction of the United States."12
There may be situations where it is inappropriate to have the same
federal criminal jurisdiction on Indian reservations as in federal en120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 2501(a).
S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1701(a).
H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 2312(a)(1).
S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1612(a).
H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 114.
S. 1630, supra note 37, § 203(a)(3).
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claves or on U.S. ships. More importantly, federal jurisdiction over
Indians deserves to be mentioned directly.
5. Follow the House bill form in the following ways: (1) Capitalize
the initial letter of the word "federal" wherever the word appears;
(2) make separate paragraphs and indent them where there are several elements to definitions of terms and where there are distinct elements of an offense (avoid the Senate practice of squeezing all
possible variations of an offense into a single subsection regardless of
how long the resulting sentence may be); (3) number terms defined
in the section of general definitions of terms used throughout the
code (the absence of such numbers in the Senate bill makes accurate
cross-referencing virtually impossible); (4) avoid the almost-archaic
word "abet" in favor of using "commands, induces, procures, or
aids;" 126 and (5) always give a brief parenthetical summary of the
subject matter of a section that is mentioned and cross-referenced in
a section except where such a summarization would be redundant or
where the subject of the other section is obvious.
6. Include in the bill, as the House did in H.R. 6915, the elements of
the general defenses to criminal liability as to which there is no serious disagreement. The Senate bill's policy, which was to leave the
defenses to common-law case decisions, is inconsistent with the objective of a code to make all salient aspects of a field of law available
and visible in systematic form. The House decision to make the elements of most of the defenses available to nonlawyers is preferable
to the Senate decision to require interested persons to search out the
case law.
7. Use the House bill's phrase "required by [f]ederal law"127 rather
than the Senate bill's phrase "required by ... a federal statute ... or

28
a regulation, rule, or order issued pursuant thereto."'
8. With respect to descriptions of federal criminal jurisdiction, use
the verb "is" (as in the House bill) rather than the open-ended verb
"includes" (as in the Senate bill).
9. When the material that follows is divided into subsections already, follow the House-bill form in making the introduction to a
29
complicated section a subsection by itself.'

126. Compare H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 501(a)(1) with S. 1630, supra note 37,
401(a)(1).
127. E.g., H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 1506.
128. E.g., S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1204.
129. Compare the form of H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 113 with that of S. 1630, supra
note 37, § 203.

10. The text of the section setting forth a description of a bar to
prosecution, such as immaturity, should include a provision, such as
the House bill does, which states that the bar can be waived. 13 0 The
principle may be obvious to lawyers familiar ,withthe case law, but it
should be set forth in the code for the benefit of ordinary citizens.
11. For the dozens of grading subsections, use the House phrase "offense under this section is," rather than the Senate phrase "offense
described in this section is." This is because the Senate phrase technically does not encompass specific offenses which are only described
in a section by cross-reference to some other provision of federal law.
Alternatively, the standard phrase should say "offense described in
this section or in a provision incorporated by reference in this section
is . "
12. Follow the House bill in designating the major subdivisions of
proposed new Title 18 as "subtitles" rather than as "parts" (the term
used in the Senate bill). This is the term used for major subdivisions
in Title 26, the Internal Revenue Code.
13. Wherever possible, avoid legal terms that may not be understood by the average citizen. Thus, follow the House bill in using the
phrase "enters or agrees to enter" 131 rather than the equivalent Sen32
ate bill phrase "contracts to enter."1
14. Use the House term when describing the offense of "impersonating an official" because it is less legalistic and "stuffy." Thus, the
House's language "engages in any conduct that asserts the authority
the actor pretends to have" 133 is easier to explain and apply than the
Senate's "purports to be exercising the authority of such public servant or foreign official."134
15. In the offense of bribery, use the House bill phrase, "with intent
to influence,"1 35 for the scienter element. The equivalent Senate bill
130. H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 702(b)(2).
131. H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 1503. Entering or Recruitingfor a ForeignArmed
Force states in relevant part: "(a) Whoever, being in the United States, knowingly (1) enters or agrees to enter the armed forces of a foreign power; commits a Class E

felony." (emphasis added).
132. S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1203. Entering or Recruiting for a Foreign Armed
Force "(a) OFFENSE - A person commits an offense if within the United States, he 1) contracts to enter the armed forces of a foreign power."
133. H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 1702(a). Impersonatingan official, states, in relevant part: "(a) Whoever, with intent to cause another person to alter or maintain that
person's course of action, knowingly pretends to be a public servant or a foreign official, and engages in any conduct that asserts the authority the actor pretends to have,

commits a Class E felony." (emphasis added).
134. S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1303(a) states, in relevant part: "(a) OFFENSE. A person commits an offense if he pretends to be a public servant or a foreign official and
purports to be exercising the authority of such public servant or foreign official."
135. H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 1751(a)(1) states, in relevant part: "(a) Whoever

knowingly -

(7) offers, gives, or agrees to give anything of pecuniary value to any per-

son with intent to influence such person regarding any particular official action by, or
the violation of any particular legal duty of, that person as a public servant."
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phrase is "in return for an agreement or understanding that the recipient's official action as a public servant will be influenced
thereby."'136 The Senate language, while it expresses the quid pro
quo nature of bribery, could be misinterpreted to require a prosecutor to prove an actual agreement or understanding.
16. Use the House term "criminal sexual conduct."137 This term is
more descriptive and unencumbered by secondary meanings than the
138
equivalent Senate term "rape."'
17. Use the House title, "Nongovernmental Bribery,"13 9 as the title
for the next to the last subchapter of the chapter on "Offenses Involving Property." The Senate title, "Commercial Bribery and Related Offenses"'140 is accurate, but it is not descriptive of the content
136. S. 1630, § 1351(a) states, in relevant part:
OFFENSE. A person commits an offense if - (2) as a public servant, he solicits,
demands, accepts, or agrees to accept from another person; anything of value
in return for an agreement or understandingthat the recipient's official action as a public servant will be influenced thereby, or that the recipient will
violate a legal duty as a public servant.
Id. (emphasis added).
137. H.R. 6915, supra note 38, § 2332, in relevant part, defines criminal sexual conduct as the following:
(a) Whoever knowingly (1) engages in a sexual act with another person who is not the actor's spouse
if such other person (A) is incapable of understanding the nature of the conduct;
(B) is physically incapable of resisting, or of declining
consent to, the sexual act;
(C) is unaware that a sexual act is being committed; or
(D) participates because of a mistaken belief that the actor is married to the
other person; or
(2) threatens another person or places another person in fear and thereby
causes that other person to engage in a sexual act with the actor; or attempts
to do so, commits a class C felony.
Id.
138. S. 1630 as reported, supra note 37, § 1642 describes rape as follows:
(a) OFFENSE. A person commits an offense if he engages in a sexual act with
another person who is not his spouse, and (1) knows that the other person is incapable of understanding the nature of
the conduct;
(2) knows that the other person is physically incapable of resisting, or declining consent to, the sexual act;
(3) knows that the other person is unaware that a sexual act is being
committed;
(4) knows that the other person participates because of a mistaken belief
that the actor is married to the other person; or
(5) compels the other person to participate by a threat or by placing the
other person in fear, other than by a means described in section 1641(a)(1).
Id.
139. Nongovernmental bribery in the House bill is subchapter VI of seven subchapters listed under "Offenses Involving Property."
140. See subchapter F of the Senate bill of chapter 17, Offenses Involving Property.

of all the sections. The subchapters in both bills contain sections on
labor briberyl41 and sports bribery;142 while these offenses are "related" to commercial bribery, they are also quite different.143
The following form, language, and style points from the Senate bill
are recommended:
18. The House bill follows the style of current federal criminal statutes in prefacing the description of each offense with the term "Whoever." None of the thirty-five states which have revised their penal
codes have adopted the "whoever" model. In the Senate bill, and the
state codes, the description of each offense begins with the following
clause: "A person commits an offense if." This style is easier to understand and more modern.
19. With respect to the offense of criminal attempt, follow the Senate bill's form of a single and unified section with a subsection which
sets forth all offenses as to which an attempt to commit the offense is
not itself an offense. 144 The House bill affirmatively included the offense of criminal attempt in the section which described each offense
as to which an attempt to commit was itself an offense. The House
approach has been rejected by the thirty-five or more states which
have enacted revised criminal codes.
20. Follow Senate form by including a section on "General Principles of Construction.' ' 1 45 The bulk of the material that would be included in this section is already federal law under Title 1 of the
United States Code. Repetition of these basic rules in Title 18 would
not be harmful and it might make the task of understanding easier
for some nonlawyer citizens.
21. Make the numbers of the several chapters in revised Title 18
consecutive, as in the Senate bill. Skipping numbers may make sense
for a body of statutory law that is organized alphabetically like present Title 18. Chapter numbers that have been omitted can be filled
as new areas such as "atomic energy offenses" appear. To skip numbers does not make sense, however, for a code that provides for all
future expansion internally and that does not classify offenses or
chapters of offenses alphabetically.
22. Follow Senate form by making "Jurisdiction"146 or "Federal
Criminal Jurisdiction" the subject of a separate chapter in revised Ti141. For the subsections on labor bribery, see S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1752; H.R.
6915, supra note 38, § 2552.
142. For sports bribery, see S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1753; H.R. 6915, supra note 38,

§ 2553.
143. Compare H.R. 6916, supra note 38, chapter 25, subchapter VI with S. 1630,
supra note 37, chapter 17, subchapter F.
144. See S. 1630, supra note 37, §§ 1001, 1004(b)(1) and (b)(2).
145. See S. 1630, supra note 37, § 112.
146. See S. 1630, supra note 37, § 201.
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tle 18. The subject does not take many pages, but it is too important
to be merely the subject of a subchapter.
23. Follow the Senate bill by using conventional American spelling,
regardless of the spelling in present Title 18. Thus, say "subpoena"
rather than "subpena" and say "kidnapping"14 7 rather than
"kidnaping."
24. Follow Senate form in giving offense sections understandable titles. There should, for example, not be any offenses in the new code
with anachronistic or incomprehensible-to-laymen titles. Offenses
with such titles as "false implication of another," "misprison of a felony," and "use of armed services as posse comitatus"' 148 are difficult
to understand and enforce. If these offenses were labeled "hindering
law enforcement," "obstruction of justice," and "misuse of military,"
they would be easier to explain to jurors.
25. Follow Senate bill form in combining conduct that constitutes
two separate sections in the House bill ("Refusing to produce information" and "Refusing to testify") 149 into one section, entitled "Re150
fusing to Testify or to Produce Information."
26.

The Senate phrase "circumstance dangerous to human life"151 is

better than the equivalent House phrase "circumstances dangerous to
the life of an individual."15 2 The latter suggests that it is necessary to
the commission of the offense that the life of a particularindividual
be threatened.
27. The Senate bill's title for the first subchapter of the final chapter of the Offenses part of the proposed code is more accurate than
the House bill's title for the equivalent subchapter. The Senate bill
entitled its subchapter "Organized Crime Offenses."1 53 The House
bill entitled its subchapter "Racketeering."154 Comparison of the
scope of the sections included in the House subchapter with a dictionary definition of the term "racketeering" suggests that the Senate title is better.
Notwithstanding the foregoing recommendations from both the
House and Senate bills, the form, language, and style of both bills can
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

See S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1621.
See H.R. 6915, supra note 38, §§ 1714, 1712, and 1771.
Id. 1733 and 1734.
S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1333.
S. 1630, supra note 37, § 1616(a)(2).
H.R. 6915 supra note 38, § 2316(a)(2).
See S. 1630, supra note 37, ch. 18, subch. A.
See H.R. 6915, supra note 38, ch. 27, subch. 1.

be improved by new approaches or by combining approaches used in
the existing bills.
28. Many of the offense sections, in both the Senate and House bills,
do not have any federal jurisdiction subsections. Knowledgeable experts will be aware that the absence of a subsection on jurisdiction
means the offense is within the general jurisdiction of the United
States, the broadest jurisdictional nexus possible. Less knowledgeable individuals may not be aware of this fact. A "Jurisdiction" subsection should, accordingly, be added to each of the Offense sections,
which now have none. The new subsections could read as follows:
"JURISDICTION. There is federal jurisdiction over an offense described or incorporated by reference in this section if the conduct
constituting the offense is committed anywhere within the United
States."
29. The title of the second subchapter in the code bill chapters on
offenses involving individual rights should be "Offenses Involving
Political Activity" rather than "Offenses Involving Political
Rights.'"155 Collecting political contributions as a federal public servant or misusing authority over personnel for a political purpose (to
take two provisions at random from the subchapters) represent political activity rather than political rights.
30. Both bills are excessive in their use of the clause and semicolon
style of writing rather than the sentence and period style. For example, section 2531(e) of the House bill and section 1731(c) of the Senate
bill set forth the jurisdictional bases for federal prosecution of theft
in a single sentence that contains more than 1,000 words. The "leadin" clause should be rewritten as a complete sentence, i.e., "There is
federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section if any of the
following is applicable." Each separate paragraph connected by a
semicolon that follows the "lead-in" clause should also be made a
56
separate sentence with appropriate punctuation.
Technical reconciliation or agreement on questions of form, language, and style should, if possible, be achieved before a new bill is
introduced in Congress. The guiding principles of form, language,
and style should accord best with the goal of a code to make federal
criminal law clearer, more logical, and more readable.
V.

CONCLUSION

Simplifying the criminal laws of the United States is in the public
interest. It would be excellent if all of the federal statutes, which au155. Subchapter B of chapter 15 of S.1630, supra note 37, and subchapter II of
chapter 21 of H.R. 6915, supra note 38, are entitled "offenses involving political rights."
156. "Semicolons should be used sparingly. Periods are usually better." THE
WASHINGTON POST, DESKBOOK ON STYLE 143 (1978).
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thorize the imposition of criminal penalties, were codified in, or
cross-referenced to, a new Title 18 of the United States Code. Unfortunately, this result is probably not "do-able" in the relatively short
time span of a single Congress. The number of criminal penalty provisions outside Title 18 is extremely large, and practically every committee of the Congress may want to conduct oversight hearings on
one or more of them.
It would be very good if all of the federal statutes in Title 18 of the
U.S. Code were rewritten in simplified form. A new Title 18 consisting of revised descriptions of major crimes, a general part, uniform
state of mind requirements, a separation of wrongful conduct and jurisdiction, and grading on the basis of severity would improve both
efficiency and understanding. The chances of a single Congress enacting a new Title 18 are much better than a few years ago, since the
enactment of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 reduced
the necessary size and scope of future criminal code bills. The passage of that Act reduced also the need to debate, within the context
of proposals to codify the law, the wisdom of a number of very divisive policy changes from present law.
It would be good if all of the general provisions and principles
which code bills have made applicable to federal offenses were added
to present Title 18. Enacting a general part and making it applicable
to existing federal offenses would be a real plus for the federal criminal justice system. It would also be good if a number of simplified
and readable statutes were passed to show judges, juries, and attorneys how much easier they are to deal with. The white-collar crime
area, which encompasses a very large number of substantive offenses,
has been recomended as a good place to start.15 7 Such a bill would
have a lively focus (white-collar law enforcement)158 instead of a
157. This idea was suggested to the author by a respected professor of criminal law,
G. Robert Blakey. The argument against this approach is that it makes the opponents
of improved white-collar law enforcement the automatic opponents of codification and
simplification. These opponents might be able to delay the code plus white-collar offenses bill by various parliamentary maneuvers that might have the effect of killing
code reform entirely.
158. The current Chairman of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the House
Judiciary Committee, Congressman John Conyers, Jr., is an avowed opponent of criminal-law codification. However, Representative Conyers is concerned about existing inadequacies in the criminal law with respect to corporate and white-collar crime. In
1980, as a member of the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Congressman Conyers
dissented from the decision to report H.R. 6915. This decision was made partially on
the ground that "[m]any of the provisions contained in H.R. 6915 throw unnecessary
obstacles in the way of meaningful deterrence and enforcement in the white-collar and
corporate crime areas." H.R. REP. No. 1396, supra note 3, at 683. Conyers pointed out

bland one (simplification and codification). In addition, since it is limited in scope, it might not require a "superman" to get it enacted.159
In my opinion, a new code bill could be passed in the 100th Congress if the following occurs:
1. The President announces that simplification of the federal criminal law is
a major goal of the Administration. The leadership of both parties in both
Houses of Congress, and in their respective Judiciary Committees, make a
commitment to pass an effective modern federal criminal code and assign the
task to members hospitable to that goal.
2. A single bill is developed, for purposes of introduction, in both Houses of
Congress.
3. This single bill is developed cooperatively by majority and minority members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees and the Attorney General. Knowledgeable and interested private citizens would have an informal
opportunity to make contributions to this development.
4. This single bill does not contain controversial policy changes from current
law. It is difficult to establish and maintain the consensus needed to enact
this type of legislation unless the participants are willing to agree, in a rather
summary fashion, to resolve policy disagreements, in favor of current law.
5. The size of the bill is kept as small as possible - i.e., to 200 pages or less;
6. The bill is limited to rules and principles applicable to all offenses and a
limited number of substantive offenses.

Simplifying federal criminal laws is in the public interest and the
necessary groundwork has been laid. All that remains is a commitment to see the task through.
that corporate and white-collar crimes cost the American public $200 billion per year
compared to $4 billion per year for all property-related street crime. Id. at 684.
159. The only criminal-code bill that has yet been reported by the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, H.R. 6915, supra note 38, may have resulted
from the presence of such a person as the applicable subcommittee chairman. According to the Committee Report, the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice held 157 public
sessions before reporting a code bill to the full committee, and the full committee held
18 days of mark-up before reporting a code bill to the full House. H.R. REP. No. 1396,
supra note 3, at 9-10. The chairman of the subcommittee was former Congressman
Robert F. Drinan, S.J. It is unlikely that another chairman will appear who is willing
to dedicate 175 days of public sessions to criminal-law revision. Reducing the task to
more human dimensions, with enactment in stages, may be a more realistic way to
proceed.

